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THEME ARTICLE: Securing the IoT 
IoT Enabled Highways 
Maintenance: Towards an 
Understanding of 
Emerging Cyber Security 
Threats 
IoT technologies are increasingly being deployed to 
support the operation and maintenance of complex 
highways infrastructure assets. However, the use of 
interconnected cyber-physical systems in such critical 
infrastructure raises important privacy, safety and 
security issues. While security issues in IoT transport 
systems and autonomous vehicles are well studied, 
there is minimal research relating to cyber security in 
the field of highways maintenance. In this paper, we 
introduce the problem domain, evidence the lack of 
existing research and provide example threats to IoT 
highways maintenance systems based on a real-
world case study. 
INTRODUCTION 
Transport has long been perceived as an important application area for the IoT. Indeed, even in 
Weiser's seminal ubiquitous computing paper, the motivating scenario includes a transport di-
mension as “Sal” uses a “forward view mirror” to monitor traffic and find a parking spot at her 
destination. This close association between pervasive technologies such as the IoT and transpor-
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global, connected society in which mobility is viewed as a service the IoT is playing a key role 
in transport sectors including logistics, traffic management, autonomous vehicles and multi-
modal ticketing. 
While topics such as autonomous vehicles attract significant levels of research attention, our 
work focuses on the more mundane yet crucial topic of maintaining the infrastructure that sup-
ports mobility – the physical roads, rails and associated assets that enable people and goods to 
move. In particular, in this paper we consider the use of the IoT to support highways mainte-
nance (HM), i.e. the process of keeping roads and associated assets (bridges, tunnels, street furni-
ture etc.) in working order. HM traditionally involves relatively low-skilled manual activities 
such as cleansing (road-sweeping), repairing (fixing potholes) and protecting (road gritting) 
highways infrastructure assets. Recently, maintainers have begun to explore new approaches to 
maintenance, evolving from traditional offline reactive “pen-and-paper” processes dependent 
primarily on tacit worker knowledge, to highly connected, cyber-physical data-driven methods. 
For example, after the 2007 floods, the UK government led a review of flood management pro-
cesses, an outcome of which was a Department for Transport initiative to promote the use of 
data-driven approaches to support more informed, proactive decision-making, to deliver efficient 
cost-effective management of highway drainage 15. Beyond applications in drainage, IoT tech-
nology is currently being deployed in other maintenance activities such as structural health moni-
toring and studies have identified a rise in operational performance by utilizing smart wireless 
sensor networks to monitor deterioration in infrastructure assets such as bridges and tunnels 13. 
However, as IoT usage increases within the sector, failure to secure such systems from malicious 
activity will leave both physical and digital transport assets open to attacks with significant cost 
and safety implications. Consider, for example, the case of a simple cyber-physical system that 
collects data from roadside drainage assets to inform cleaning schedules. Potential attacks could 
result in serious surface water flooding incidents, long-term damage to valuable highways assets 
(tarmac damage), increased risk of accidents and significantly impact journey time reliability 
with corresponding economic impact. Furthermore, the future integration of real-time mainte-
nance data with intelligent transport systems such as “Connected and Autonomous Vehicles” 6 
will significantly increase the opportunities for malicious attackers to compromise these systems, 
e.g. by reporting incorrect road conditions to vehicles. 
The use of IoT systems in such critical infrastructure thus raises important safety and security 
issues. We seek to begin to address this gap in current research – furthering the community’s un-
derstanding of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of IoT based systems used in highway 
maintenance and highlighting the need for further research in this area. Evidence of a lack of 
prior research in this area is provided based on the results of a systematic literature review of 
current IoT transport research (see section 4). 
2 UNDERSTANDING HIGHWAYS MAINTENANCE 
VULNERABILITIES  
Our early insights into cyber-security threats in IoT-based HM systems are based on our recent 
experiences of developing a novel cyber-physical system designed to help highways maintainers 
monitor the state of their drainage assets and to automatically determine when maintenance is 
required. The system was developed over a two-year period by a multidisciplinary team with 
technical expertise in pervasive systems, data science and wireless communications. The results 
included a novel highway wireless communications network based on the LoRa standard and a 
rugged IoT sensor probe capable of monitoring and communicating the real-time conditions of 
highways drainage assets (known in the UK as road-side gullies). Following an iterative design 
and evaluation process the gully probe and supporting wireless network underwent several alter-
ations due to the technical, environmental and process challenges of deploying and supporting a 
cyber-physical system on the highways network. The final system supported real-time monitor-
ing of highways drainage assets, transmission of in-field data through a road-side wireless com-
munications network to a centralised data processing platform, inference of new statistical 
models to predict asset conditions (e.g. future risk of flooding), and, new forms of information 
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visualisation to support decision-making activities. It is now deployed in multiple locations in 
the UK. 
Our involvement in the end-to-end process of developing a novel cyber-physical maintenance 
system has provided valuable insights into potential vulnerabilities and threats maintainers are 
likely to encounter. We categorise vulnerabilities according to the ’three pillars’ model of cyber-
security 1 where a vulnerability represents an identified weakness of a ’resource’ (i.e. technol-
ogy, people and processes) involved in the activity of supporting and performing HM. 
Furthermore, we describe threats that aim to exploit vulnerabilities based on the STRIDE model 
to align with commonly used terms (e.g. intrusion, tampering and spoofing) 5. 
2.1 Technology  
The deployment of IoT technology within the HM infrastructure leads to a growth in the volume 
of sensitive datasets, computing systems and physical devices – each of which introduces poten-
tial attack areas. 
2.1.1 Need to instrument physical assets  
The physical security of IoT components is a common consideration during the deployment of 
cyber-physical systems 3. In contrast to transport modes such as rail and air where physical secu-
rity measures (i.e. fencing, barriers) are implemented to mitigate against physical intrusion, high-
ways assets such as traffic lights, bridges and signposts reside primarily within public 
environments (e.g. residential streets) providing relatively easy access to would-be attackers.  
Our experiences of deploying IoT assets for HM have highlighted how maintainers can begin to 
address physical security vulnerabilities. For example, network components can be installed in 
locations that provide a level of security from physical intrusion such as high on lamp-posts or 
sealed within the asset. However, for monitoring asset conditions at ground-level it remains ex-
tremely challenging to physically secure IoT equipment. 
The risk of physical threats to in-field technology for maintainers could be far-reaching – repairs 
to damaged IoT hardware or callouts of operatives to attend to assets that report false problems 
may have major cost and safety implications. The deployment of IoT technology dictates that 
maintainers must begin to consider the challenge of physical access and investigate new ap-
proaches to ensure instrumented highways assets are physically secure. 
2.1.2 Need to capture and manage new forms of data 
Historically highways maintainers’ awareness of asset conditions and performance has been lim-
ited – for example, in many areas of the UK the highways drainage asset inventory is incomplete 
and outdated due to the cost of performing asset inspections. As cyber-physical assets become 
more prevalent across the network, managing large quantities of data from IoT sensors poses 
new challenges for maintainers. While cybersecurity threats to data stored in online repositories 
are well known, for maintainers the threat of information disclosure of new datasets that describe 
the state of highways assets and the maintenance activities performed carries a number of spe-
cific risks – e.g. members of the public could use performance data to question why their street 
drainage system had not been cleaned prior to a major flood, managing authorities could use the 
data to monitor contractual KPIs, and competitors could use the information in preparing bids for 
new contracts. While new awareness over the condition of highways infrastructure is benefi-
cial to maintainers it introduces privacy and security risks through information disclosure 
threats that could compromise contractual agreements, impact reputation and result in 
economic loss. 
2.1.3 Use of data in 3rd party safety-critical applications  
The transport sector is shifting towards a paradigm of ’intelligent mobility’ delivering greater 
integration, intelligence and automation of transport services. The provision and availability of 
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new forms of asset data has the potential to enhance the performance of many aspects of the in-
telligent mobility paradigm. For example, HM data could be integrated with connected and au-
tonomous vehicle systems to support navigation that is sensitive to road conditions and 
maintenance activities. Our understanding of HM vulnerabilities is limited, yet the integration 
between autonomous vehicle and HM systems introduces new attack channels in which attackers 
could compromise perceived low-risk, low-security systems (i.e. maintenance systems) to ma-
nipulate high-impact assets to maximise influence over particular aspects of the network (e.g. 
traffic flows, congestion, damage to assets). For example, performing changes to data that de-
scribes a highway's predicted flood risk could be utilised in real-time autonomous vehicle navi-
gation software to orchestrate massive changes in fleet routing. 
It is therefore important that maintainers and transport planners begin to consider the use of data 
beyond the support of maintenance activities. For maintainers, integration with 3rd party systems 
introduce new attack surfaces that must be secured, while new interconnected sub-systems must 
begin to support capabilities to quickly identify malicious activity across the transport ecosystem 
(similar to fraud detection algorithms in the banking sector). The paradigm shifts towards in-
telligent mobility and the deepening integration across intelligent mobility services will en-
able the use of IoT HM data across new transport applications and services. Greater 
integration introduces new attack surfaces and the potential for proxy intrusion attacks 
through less secure maintenance systems.  
2.2 People  
2.2.1 New relationships with developers & technical stakeholders 
The IoT is facilitating the digitisation of existing working practices, change in organisational 
roles and empowerment of workers 11. HM activities have traditionally required manual opera-
tives to undertake physical work on the network, such as fixing potholes, repairing street lamps 
and cleansing highways assets. Similarly, the coordination and planning of maintenance work 
has involved fairly straightforward processes, with the planning of work based primarily on local 
knowledge and worker intuition. Our recent collaboration with maintainers has emphasised the 
growing reliance on external technical support to develop and understand new aspects of the 
maintenance process, such as interpreting sensor data and applying it to inform decisions. This 
raises security concerns, particularly spoofing or ’elevation of privilege’ threats where multiple 
stakeholders (e.g. I.T administrators, data architects, data analysts) can access system compo-
nents used to support maintenance activities. 
For traditional maintainers, the challenge is in understanding how to securely manage the emerg-
ing complexity and diversity of existing and new workers and raises technical considerations of 
how to support authentication and authorisation models for both physical and digital assets. For 
example, in-field workers will require physical access to assets instrumented with IoT compo-
nents to undertake maintenance activities such as cleansing a road-side drain but physical prox-
imity could be viewed as an ’elevation of privilege’ threat where in-field workers gain 
unregulated access to system hardware. New dependencies on 3rd party developers and tech-
nical support workers represent a significant shift in the culture of the maintenance work-
force. More complex maintenance activities that involve a growing number of manual and 
technical workers have the potential to introduce new threats that disrupt operations or 
compromise data privacy. 
2.2.2 Need for IoT training & certification  
While HM typically involves relatively simple manual labour, in contrast, the act of instrument-
ing highway assets with IoT hardware can require a complex understanding of both the physical 
asset and the technical components that need to be installed and configured. For example, our 
experience of deploying IoT infrastructure to monitor road-side drainage has illustrated the chal-
lenges in-field operatives would likely encounter, such as the need to understand in detail the 
drainage asset type and relevant depth in order to install the drainage sensor probe in the correct 
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position. As a second example, the positioning of wireless communication receivers to relay 
transmission from drainage sensor probes requires an understanding of both wireless propaga-
tions to ensure receivers are in range, and appropriate training to connect devices to mains power 
via street lamp-posts. These emerging activities highlight new challenges for maintainers to sup-
port a repeatable and verifiable installation of IoT hardware to avoid erroneous data. This is par-
ticularly important as accidental or malicious actions could be performed by in-field operatives 
through the incorrect configuration of in-field hardware that would go undetected. For maintain-
ers, the risks of losing trust and confidence in the data could compromise coordination and plan-
ning activities. The installation of the IoT on highways networks is complex. Without new 
IoT training and certification for in-field operatives, maintainers risk repudiation threats 
where the quality of the installation and the data cannot be verified. 
2.3 Process  
2.3.1 Lack of domain-specific IoT standards & regulation  
HM industry understanding and knowledge of implementing the IoT, as represented by domain-
specific standards and regulations to help guide maintenance and local authority organisations, is 
limited. Currently, managing highways authorities are open to technology providers implement-
ing a broad range of IoT wireless communications technologies (e.g. LoRa, SigFox or NB-IoT) 
to facilitate the transfer of data from IoT sensors to cloud-based services. Without an awareness 
of how these networks perform within a road-side context, and suitable procedures in place to 
ensure deployed IoT technology is reliable and complies with highways sector acceptance 
measures (as applied in the rail sector), latent vulnerabilities have the potential to emerge that 
enable attackers to compromise safety and security of the wider highways network. For example, 
where uncontrolled access to road-side wireless networks by multiple IoT applications is not reg-
ulated, new opportunities for eavesdropping or manipulation of services could be facilitated. 
Further IoT research and innovation is required within the HM sector to begin to develop 
domain-specific standards and governance to address currently unregulated development, 
deployment and management of cyber-physical systems to mitigate against associated secu-
rity threats and risks to the wider highways network. 
3 IOT SECURITY IN RELATED DOMAINS  
The consideration of security threats is not uncommon in other transport and infrastructure IoT 
domains—including autonomous vehicles, rail, and smart grids. While the general objectives of 
securing the IoT are common, it is only when a particular application of the technology is under-
stood in context that researchers can begin to effectively articulate the unique characteristics (e.g. 
valued assets, vulnerabilities and risks) of a security problem posed to sector organisations, and 
the different strategies required to address them. 
In this section, we analyse the characteristics of related application domains (§3.1 - §3.3) that 
leverage data-driven, cyber-physical technologies and discuss the novelty and applicability of 
emerging HM security vulnerabilities in contrast to these domains. Key differences are high-
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Table 1. Comparison with related domains  
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3.1 Connected and Autonomous Vehicles  
Security vulnerabilities and issues have been well studied in the context of systems and commu-
nication protocols supporting autonomous driving 4, 12. In particular, vehicle-to-vehicle and vehi-
cle-to-infrastructure communication are crucial to ensure the safety of passengers as part of 
collision warning systems or automated traffic flow management 4. Raya et al. have identified 
open security issues such as providing secure positioning of the vehicle, data verification to pro-
tect against forging attacks, and DoS resilience against jamming of the network infrastructure 12. 
To address these issues, the authors have developed a dedicated security architecture which has 
the potential to be applied to other IoT domains. For example, Raya et al. suggest the use of ded-
icated hardware components for handling crucial data using encrypted communication protocols 
and storage to increase the burdens for malicious access, and verification procedures on a per-
data-package basis to protect against “in-transit traffic tampering” 12. In the context of utilising 
the IoT for HM, following such existing security architectures could help with protecting against 
known security vulnerabilities.  
3.2 Rail Network  
IoT and digital technologies are commonly used for controlling rail traffic flow and track availa-
bilities 7. As part of efforts for protecting critical infrastructures, the UK Department for 
Transport issued a “guidance to industry” for the national rail sector to contribute to “reducing its 
vulnerability to cyber attack” 7. The guidance document emphasises the emerging threats and 
vulnerabilities due to the use of standardised components and communication protocols, and the 
interconnectivity of controlling systems. Specific threats include remote cyber attacks against the 
software and communication infrastructure that could cause disruptions in the rail network, loss 
of sensitive information regarding the rail infrastructure, and put both customers and mainte-
nance workers at risk. The guidance document contains recommendations to help protect rail 
systems against cyber attacks, including the design and implementation of modern technologies 
and standards “with security in mind as an integral part of the system”, and considering security 
as an important aspect of the system throughout its entire life-cycle including installation, 
maintenance and disposal.  
3.3 Smart Grids  
Similar to the U.K.’s efforts in helping to secure the railway infrastructure, the U.S.’s National 
Institute for Standards and Technology issued a set of “Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Secu-
rity” 14. Whilst specific vulnerabilities have not been included in the document, the authors point 
out that vulnerabilities in the grid network can have economic, safety and ecological impact on 
communities, resulting in unique performance and resilience requirements compared to other IoT 
systems. To support industry and institutions in implementing appropriate precautions and proce-
dures in their software systems and processes, a detailed set of requirements and risk assessment 
guidelines have been outlined as part of the document ranging from high-level requirements (e.g. 
awareness of the risk of vulnerabilities and processes for incident responses), to specific require-
ments pertaining to the implementation of sufficient cryptography, data integrity and access con-
trol mechanisms. It may be possible that elements of these guidelines can be generalised out to 
other domains of the IoT including HM systems. For example, the recommendation for appropri-
ate permission and access control, and the auditing of systems connected to the IoT infrastructure 
can be seen as a crucial part of keeping systems secure beyond smart grids.  
3.4 Comparative Analysis  
3.4.1 Technology  
Physical Environments. Physical access security controls are critical to ensure threats such as 
tampering with cyber-physical asset hardware are minimised. For highways sector organisations 
(see §2.1.1) this is particularly challenging given that the majority of the highways infrastructure 
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is open and publicly accessible. In related domains such as the UK's National Grid and Rail Net-
work infrastructure cyber-physical assets are deployed within an isolated environment that is 
highly protected (e.g. fencing), primarily due to the threat to human safety (i.e. electrification of 
substations, high-speed rolling stock) and hence physical vulnerabilities of IoT assets are per-
ceived to be less of a security concern. For non-infrastructure domains such as connected and 
autonomous vehicles (CAVs) IoT instrumentation is typically encased internally within the vehi-
cle body, and leverage established physical security mechanisms (e.g. door locks and alarms) 
developed within the automotive sector.  
Data Management and Availability. The use of cyber-physical technologies raises new tech-
nical and security challenges for organisations when attempting to effectively manage new forms 
of data that describe business processes and provide detailed insights into the internal operation 
of an organisation (see §2.1.2). While the risks of reputational and economic damage from data 
leaks are well known in many commercial sectors, for the HM sector the implications of captur-
ing and managing new forms of data that describe the detailed performance of business assets 
(e.g. drainage conditions) are not well understood. While industries producing CAVs also face 
new risks, in contrast to the highways sector they are comprised of “technology-first” organisa-
tions that already understand the implications of sensitive data disclosure to attackers, and em-
ploy well-informed technical strategies to handle and secure the storage of data in the cloud. 
Differences in data management also occur in each domain – for example, data from in-vehicle 
IoT sensors are managed locally to support artificial intelligence (AI) decisions that control key 
vehicle operations such as steering and the drivetrain. This reduces the need to be concerned 
with vulnerabilities and threats that may target data stored in the cloud. 
3.4.2 People  
Diverging Workforce and Skills. The HM workforce has traditionally been dominated by man-
ual in-field operatives undertaking physical work on the network, such as fixing potholes and 
cleansing highways assets. As the sector moves towards more innovative data-driven processes, 
new technical skills must be integrated and managed within what is currently a low-tech literally 
domain to develop and support emerging technical systems (see §2.2.2). In contrast, the energy 
and rail maintenance sectors have extensive experience of managing internal workforces that 
comprise both highly certified technicians and more low-skill operatives. Therefore, these do-
mains are much better equipped to adjust to new innovative approaches internally without the 
need to outsource aspects of their work to 3rd party developers, and subsequently avoid the risk 
of introducing new vulnerabilities that could open them up to additional cyber security threats 
(see §2.2.1).  
3.4.3 Process  
Technical innovation and management procedures. The level of technical innovation within 
the HM sector has been relatively stagnant in comparison to advances in adjacent domains such 
as in smart grid energy and rail infrastructure management. As a result, internal procedures and 
guidance centred around the development, adoption and management of new emerging cyber-
physical technologies are lacking within the sector, and therefore expose maintainers to a num-
ber of process-related security challenges (see §2.3.1). In contrast, within the rail sector regulated 
product acceptance processes exist internally to ensure new technologies meet specific perfor-
mance criteria, while further guidance and best practice resources are enforced that aim to ensure 
cyber security threats are addressed. 
 
4 EVIDENCING A LACK OF PRIOR RESEARCH  
While general IoT security is an area of intense research activity 8 we are particularly interested 
in the potential for domain-specific threats that are not covered by such general work.  
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4.1 Methodology  
To explore the extent of prior research we conducted a systematic literature review, loosely 
based on the “Procedures for Performing Systematic Reviews” proposed by Kitchenham 10. By 
choosing a systematic approach we aimed to conduct a comprehensive and transparent analysis 
of the literature to address the following three research questions:  
RQ1: Is there a body of literature that addresses security concerns in IoT–based HM? 	
RQ2: Which threats/threat models have been identified in the literature in the scope of 
IoT based HM?  
RQ3: Are there design guidelines or recommendations provided by the literature to 
address threats in IoT HM systems?  
4.1.1 Search Process  
Data Sources 
HM systems represent a multidisciplinary field of research including transportation, civil, me-
chanical and electrical engineering, electronics, communication technologies and computer sci-
ence. We selected four widely recognised digital libraries, covering the majority of publications 
in each relevant discipline:  
ACM Digital Library: Computer science, communication technologies 	
IEEE Xplore: Computer science, electrical engineering, communication technologies  
ScienceDirect: Computer science, transportation, civil, mechanical and electrical  
engineering  
Scopus: Computer science, transportation, civil, mechanical and electrical  
engineering, electronics, communication technologies  
 
Keywords  
We developed a comprehensive set of search terms comprising of four keyword groups (high-
ways, IoT, maintenance, security) from which our search queries were built. All keywords were 
based on an initial manual literature survey and were proposed and discussed among all authors. 
The keyword table (see table 2) includes a large number of synonyms, common abbreviations 
and acronyms (e.g. IoT), country-specific names (e.g. motorway and freeway) as well as related 
terms. In total we identified a set of 56 keywords, resulting in a total of 18000 unique queries. 
 
Search keywords 
highway: motorway, auobahn, freeway, road, street, traffic, roadside, intersection, junction 
internet of things: iot, Cyber-physical system, Sensor Networks, Web of Things, Internet of Everything, 
Smart infrastructure, Connected devices, connected things, connected objects, Net-
worked devices, Networked things, Networked objects, Smart devices, Smart things, 
Smart objects, Car-to-infrastructre, C2M, Vehicle-to-infrastructure, V2I, V2X, Machine-
to-Machine, M2M, M2X, machine-to-infrastructure, IoV, M2I, inter-connected, intelligent 
transportation systems,  
 
maintenance: management, operation, improvement, repair, road works 
security: vulnerabilities, vulnerable, vulnerab, attack, threat, privacy, resilience, violence, trust 
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Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Following the systematic approach, inclusion and exclusion criteria were determined. We in-
cluded literature from our four data sources that were: peer-reviewed; written in English; con-
tained any valid keyword combination; and, was a description/study/simulation of a system with 
an IoT component that supports HM or was a literature review of IoT-based HM. We excluded: 
duplicate publications of the same study/article; papers where the search terms were used in a 
different meaning/context (e.g. security related to road safety); papers where security considera-
tions were not related to IoT-based HM. 
Computerised approach  
Due to the large number of keyword combinations, we developed a Python script to query the 
source databases. The software searches for scientific articles that contain valid search keyword 
combinations in the abstract and returns meta-data related for the results (i.e. the name of the 
source library, the library-id, DOI, names of author(s), title, abstract, the name of the publication 
and author keywords).  
To reduce the number of queries we issued to the libraries the search was split into a primary 
search excluding the security keywords and a secondary search, applying the security keywords 
on the initial results. By doing so, we were able to reduce the number of queries against the digi-
tal libraries by 90%. In total, we performed 1,800 queries across each digital library totalling 
7,200 queries.  
4.1.2 Review Process  
The review process consisted of three distinct steps. Following a screening process where irrele-
vant and duplicate data were removed, we conducted an initial review based on the collected 
metadata and our inclusion and exclusion criteria. During this initial review, we produced a short 
summary of the paper and classified each paper as:  
Accept: The publication is related to the subject and relevant according to the inclu-
sion criteria.  
Borderline: The publication might be related to the subject and/or might be relevant 
according to the inclusion criteria.  
Reject: The publication is not related to the subject and/or not relevant according to 
the inclusion criteria.  
Delete: The publication is not related to the subject e.g. false positive, linguistic ambi-
guities.  
Each assessment was peer-reviewed by at least one other reviewer. In case of discrepancies, a 
third author reviewed the paper and mediated until a consensus was reached. The remaining pa-
pers marked “accept” or “borderline” were subjected to an in-depth analysis.  
4.2 Results  
Searching for papers on HM and the IoT returned a total of 1,972 publications. Restricting these 
papers to those that also discussed security resulted in a set of 308 papers that we used for our 
literature review. From this set, 111 publications were removed based on further application of 
our inclusion/exclusion criteria (34 duplicates, 77 not peer-reviewed) leaving 197 publications 
remaining. 
A review of these 197 publications identified a strong focus (32 papers) on Vehicular Traffic 
Management Systems, i.e. traffic flow control systems, dynamic speed management, intersection 
management, collision avoidance, emergency unit dispatching or incident detection. These sys-
tems are closely linked to HM and may even rely on data aggregated from IoT sensors deployed 
by highways operators. Hence, major concerns such as operational safety, security and privacy 9 
are of relevance to IoT-driven HM.  
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During the review, we also identified a large number of publications in the field of car-to-car and 
car-to-infrastructure communication (28 publications) as well as wireless sensor networks (18 
publications). The identified research covers many security issues such as secure communica-
tions and threat models for vehicular networks 2.  
Applying our classification scheme to identify papers that directly addressed HM, the IoT and 
security we classified 20 as accept or borderline during the meta-data review and these were sub-
jected to an in-depth analysis. While the meta-data and abstracts indicated that these papers 
might be of direct relevance, closer examination revealed very little information relating to RQ1 
and none of the reviewed publications contained relevant information related to the research 
questions RQ2 and RQ3. In summary, our literature review indicates a clear gap in research that 
focuses on cyber-security threats in IoT-based HM systems.  
5 CLOSING REMARKS  
Modern society relies on safe, secure and efficient transport networks. Increasing pressure on 
these networks is leading their owners and operators to deploy IoT technologies in an effort to 
improve the overall effectiveness of the networks. However, our research suggests that little at-
tention has been paid to the domain-specific security threats that arise when deploying IoT 
within the transport sector – and in particular when using the IoT to support routine HM and op-
erational tasks. In this paper, we have not proposed specific solutions but instead have focused 
on describing examples of challenges for the highways sector and evidencing lack of prior work 
through a systematic literature review. In so doing, we hope to catalyse new research in the field 
in order to ensure we are able to continue to rely on our transport infrastructure in the future.  
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